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PHILOSOPHY'S BOWL OF POTTAGE: 
REFLECTIONS ON THE VALUE OF FAITH 
Richard E. Creel 
If you were given an opportunity to choose between (1) knowing the way reality 
is and (2) having enduring faith that there is a God in the classical theistic sense, on 
the condition that you could not have both and your choice would be irreversible, 
which would you choose? I hope to receive many responses to this question, but 
for the next few pages please allow me to share with you my own reflections on 
these alternatives. 
If I choose to know the way reality is and it turns out to be a way that depresses 
me, there will be a sense in which my knowledge has not helped me but wounded 
me without hope of healing-surely a good reason to think twice about making that 
choice. If I choose faith in God, then, as Cardinal Newman might put it, I may 
have difficulties with my faith, but I will not have doubts. No matter what happens 
to me or around me, I will have confidence that all things "work together for the 
good of those who love God." Moreover, ifI have such a faith in God, then even 
when I do not feel happy, I will be confident that nonetheless I am richly blessed 
and will not be ultimately abandoned. Moreover, even if! feel depressed, I can fly 
by my instruments if I have faith; that is, I can trust that all is well even when I can-
not see for sure that it is. Best of all, I will feel this way even if there is no God! 
Very well, so I want to be happy and therefore would prefer the confidence of 
faith to the risk of knowledge, but which way ought I to choose? Don't we have a 
moral obligation to choose knowledge over ignorance? My knee jerk response is 
"yes, we do." My considered judgment is "no, we don't." I see no way to justify 
the claim that we ought to seek every kind of knowledge. The world would not be 
better off for knowing how to torture infants just short of rendering them uncon-
scious. The world would not be better off for knowing how many names there are 
in the Ottowa telephone directory that end in "d" and also contain an "a". Surely 
we have no obligation to seek such knowledge. Therefore we have no obligation to 
seek all knowledge. 
A critic might reply. "But just as surely the question of the nature of reality is a 
more significant question than that of random names in a phone book and is not an 
odious question like that of methods for torturing the innocent. Further, just be-
cause we are not obligated to seek all knowledge it does not follow that we have no 
obligation to seek any know ledge. Perhaps there are special items of know ledge 
that we do have an obligation to seek." 
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Perhaps so, but do we have an unqualified obligation to seek above all things 
knowledge of the nature of reality? If we did have such an obligation it would fol-
low that in a situation in which I felt that I was onto something very important 
about the nature of reality but was interrupted mid-stream by my wife infonning 
me that our child had suddenly come down with a life-threatening fever, I should 
first finish my thoughts or reading before rushing my child to the hospital. But 
surely such an implication is morally repugnant. At best, then, it might be that we 
have an obligation to seek knowledge of the nature of reality whenever that pursuit 
does not conflict with a higher obligation. Hence, we must ask, do we have a 
higher obligation to seek faith or knowledge? 
Speaking abstractly, it seems to me that my highest moral obligation is to be-
lieve and live in a way that is compatible with and supportive of the supreme value; 
the supreme value, I believe, is universal happiness. I This entails that I should hold 
beliefs, or at least have hopes, that are compatible with and supportive of this pos-
sibility. Now certainly the achievement of universal happiness is possible in some 
significant sense if there is a God. It mayor may not be possible if there is not a 
God. If there is not a God and therefore universal happiness may not be possible, I 
would rather not know it; I would rather have faith that there is such a being and 
that therefore universal happiness is possible. My highest moral obligation, then, 
is not to seek knowledge but to honor the good. Should someone try to take away 
my faith in the reality of the good by attempting to persuade me that the truth about 
reality is such that we cannot rejoice in it, I would and should resist with all my re-
sources. If my own mind begins to assualt me with doubts in addition to difficul-
ties, I should belittle its powers. After all, it is plausible that the devil would at-
tempt to manipulate my mind to destroy my faith, but it it not plausible that he 
would give me faith-a force that can mock him, laugh at him, and outlast him. 
Is it, then, ever morally pennissi!Jle to choose ignorance over knowledge? Yes, 
it is whenever we are faced with mutually exclusive alternatives and the alternative 
that would involve ignorance would also involve a value greater than that of 
knowledge of the nature of reality. What might such a value be? Universal fullness 
of life. If life can be lived as fully and perhaps more fully by choosing something 
that involves ignorance of x than by choosing something that involves knowledge 
of x, then we should choose the alternative that involves ignorance of x. 
I Now let's approach our question of the value of faith from a different angle. If 
you had a deep and abiding faith in the existence of God, for what would you trade 
it? Would you trade it for knowledge of the nature of reality? If you did, you might 
discover that there is a God-in which case you would get back what you had 
traded off-maybe; there is an important question as to whether knowledge that 
there is a God would be as personalIy satisfying as faith that there is. As Pascal has 
written, "The knowledge of God is very far from the love of Him," and as Kier-
kegaard has quipped, "To stand on one leg and prove God's existence is a very dif-
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ferent thing from going on one's knees and thanking Him."2 But if you chose 
knowledge and discovered that there is no God, then you would have lost forever 
the possibility of faith. Could the knowledge you had gained possibly be worth the 
loss sustained? Wouldn't a person have to be foolish to trade off his faith in God for 
anything else? 
Recall the words offaith by St. Paul in Romans 8. He begins by asking, "Shall 
tribulation or distress or persecution or famine or nakedness or peril or sword sepa-
rate us from the love of God?" "No," he peals out, "in all these things we are more 
than conquerors through him who loved us. For I am sure," he continues, "that 
neither death, nor life, nor angels, nor principalities, nor things present, nor 
height, nor depth, nor any thing else in all creation, will be able to separate us from 
the love of God ... "Recall the insights of Leo Tolstoy, who after a period of suic-
idal depression wrote that though faith had not lost its unreasonableness for him, 
he had come to realize that faith alone gives us answers to the questions of life, and 
consequently gives us the possibility of living. It is in consequence of faith, he 
wrote, that "man does not destroy himself, but lives."3 Recall the words of Carl 
Jung who wrote, 
No matter what the world thinks about religious experience, the one who 
has it possesses the great treasure of a thing that has provided him with a 
source of life, meaning and beauty and that has given a new splendor to 
the world and to mankind. He has pistis [faith] and peace. Where is the 
criticism by which you could say that such a life is not legitimate, that 
such experience is not valid and that suchpistis [faith] is mere illusion? Is 
there, as a matter of fact, any better truth about ultimate things than the 
one that helps you to live?' 
Recall all these words and then ask, "What could possibly be of greater value than 
faith, or even equal to it?" And if it is the pearl of supreme value, wouldn't it be 
supremely unreasonable to trade it for anything else? Doesn't reason itself require 
that we place faith above knowledge? 
One implication of my analysis is that I should fight with all my heart, soul, 
mind, and strength to defend that most precious gift called faith. I believe this sen-
timent explains the vigor of apologetics in the history of religions. It also helps ex-
plain the attacks of believers upon reason. Consider Lev Shestov' s attack in Athens 
and Jerusalem upon the lust for knowledge. Consider Karl Barth's conviction that 
faith cannot convince reason; it can only preach to it. Consider Luther's insistence 
that we must tear out the eyes of reason. Perhaps Barth's instinct was right: to enter 
seriously into rational dialogue about one's faith is already to have succumbed to 
the eyes of the snake of reason. If so, then obviously it is critically important to 
keep clear the distinction between apologetics (which is a defensive action by 
which one protects one's great treasure) and rational dialogue (which is an enter-
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prise in which one submits to the rules of reason and is prepared to abandon the 
thesis with which one begins as soon as it is shown to be "unreasonable"). 
I used to disdain the apologist because he appeared on the one hand to be hypoc-
ritical (by presenting the appearance of entering seriously into dialogue with the 
nonbeliever while not in fact doing so) and on the other hand to be afraid (afraid to 
submit his faith to unqualified philosophical scrutiny, lest it be shown to be false or 
questionable). But now I see another side to the apologist's fear and reserve. The 
believer is wisely loathe to enter into dialectic with the unbeliever because he 
knows his own weakness and ignorance. He knows that by entering such dialectic 
seriously he is placing himself into a situation in which he might lose his most pre-
cious possession-not because it is not most precious, but because he might not be 
able to see through the arguments of the unbeliever and become paralyzed by 
them, or because God might correctly see his willingness to run such a risk as a 
kind of hubris or foolhardiness or promiscuousness and withdraw His gift of faith. 
After all, if our petition that we not be led into temptation is sincere, then surely we 
will not walk into it with our eyes wide open! Preach to the unbeliever, sure; con-
verse with him, yes; enter into dialogue with him-up to a point; but when the 
chips are down and you've got nothing left to gamble with but your pearl of great 
price, for goodness sake walk away from the table. It would be the height of folly 
to make such a wager merely for the sake of a final effort to win over the unbe-
liever. And if that's not the motive, what is it? Are you trying to prove something 
to yourself? And if so, aren't you jumping off temples, commanding stones to tum 
into loaves of bread, falling down and worshipping reason in expectation that if 
you do then at last you can have your great treasure as a possession rather than a 
gift? 
Regarding the appearance of hypocrisy on the apologist's part, I now believe 
that sometimes my belief that a believer had only been pretending to engage in ra-
tional dialogue was a result of my hasty assumption that because he was willing to 
talk with me about his faith, he was accepting the rules of philosophical dialogue, 
and in particular the rule that belief should be proportioned to evidence. Then 
when I would notice the believer "click off' at some point in the dialogue, I would 
feel that he had never really been serious about our discussion; that he had only 
been playing me along until he could tell whether I might be won over. No doubt 
some believers do enter conversations with non-believers in this self-conscious, 
scheming way, but more often, I now suspect, when the believer "clicks off' in 
mid-dialogue it is because he has begun to sense that something dangerous has 
begun to occur. The apologist's halt, I suspect, is based on a dim feeling that to 
continue would be to cooperate with the unbeliever in disabusing himself of his 
most precious possession; obviously a foolish thing to do. Just as obviously, no 
one can be certain that he will maintain his faith forever, but at least one can do his 
best to ensure that if he ever does lose his faith he will not have been party to the 
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forces that breached his wall. To relate my point to a different context, I will not 
participate in an effort to prove that my father has done something awful. Others 
may have an obligation to provide such proof, but my obligation is to stand by and 
defend my father. To be sure, maybe he did do something awful, and maybe there 
isn't a God, but to cooperate in an attack upon my father or my faith would be to 
betray those relationships and make them impossible. 
For these kinds of reasons, dialogue between believer and non-believer almost 
always reaches a point beyond which the believer is not willing to go. This point, 
I have suggested, is the point at which the believer begins to feel that he would be 
passing over from showing that his position has rational merit or that the non-
believer's position has rational problems to taking seriously the possibility that his 
faith is untrue. At that point the believer breaks off the conversation in one way or 
another and the non-believer becomes frustrated because he feels that he had the 
believer on the run. From the nonbeliever's point of view the believer just got up 
and walked away from the chess game in which he would have been checkmated in 
a few more moves! From the believer's point of view , ifhe had played any further 
he may have actively participated in bringing about the capture of his own king, 
and since the believer's ultimate objective is not to capture his opponent's king but 
to protect his own, he is satisfied to walk away with an unfinished game or a draw. 
After all, philosophical dialogue is just a game; it settles nothing finally about the 
nature of reality. And just because one believer couldn't figure a way to save his 
king does not mean that it couldn't have been done by ano!her believer. I am re-
minded of a Catholic friend with whom I had a rousing debate in our sophomore 
year of college. His final response was that I ought to go talk to some priests he 
knew. "Those guys," he said, "have all the answers." 
Certainly I would rather that my religious life, like that of my friend, be based on 
faith than on the ebb and flow of evidence that must be weighed by reason from day 
to day. I would rather live with the illusion that the good is real and ultimate than 
with the knowledge that it is not; therefore I would prefer such an illusion to an op-
portunity to know whether my faith is an illusion or not. Is this a cowardly, undig-
nified attitude? I don't think so. Isn't dignity a laughable virtue whenever it is 
purchased at the price of one's happiness? Isn't it a stodgy thing compared to the 
foolishness of faith? And where is the courage in conceding what the evidence in-
dicates? Doesn't it take more courage to knowingly swim against the evidence than 
to go along with it? To be sure, I am familiar with the contempt that people like 
Freud and Sartre heap upon religious faith, but why should I care what they say if 
accepting what they say would crush the buoyancy out of my life? 
I agree with Aristotle that we should "strain every nerve to live in accordance 
with the best thing in us," but I do not agree with him that reason is the best thing 
in us. Rather, I believe that the best thing in us is our vision of the good, and that vi-
sion is not a product of reason, nor is it subject to the scrutiny of reason. It is a 
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given, a revelation, and a standard by which reason itself is to be judged. Con-
sequently, we should above all value faith that our vision of the good is veridical. 
In conclusion, the trusting though aching heart of the believer in the face of evil 
is based on faith that there is One who can and will reconcile history with perfect 
goodness. Evil presented as evidence against the existence of God is irrelevant to 
the believer because to have faith that there is a God is to have faith that there is 
One by whom all the evils of history can be justified and will be overcome. Faith, 
then, is the solvent in which the previously impenetrable shell of the problem of 
evil begins to dissolve and reveal a vulnerable core. By this inaugural effect faith 
takes away the terror of history, makes life rich in the best of circumstances and 
possible even in the worst of them. Above all, then, it is faith, not knowledge, that 
we should value and pray for. 
Ithaca College 
NOTES 
1. When I speak of happiness as an ideal, I am speaking of moral happiness, i.e., happiness acquired 
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1963), p. 29. 
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